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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL SOCIAL POLICY
There have been many changes in the social policy of the United 
States over the years. This paper takes a look at the general social 
policy and how the job and training programs have become a part of 
this social policy. No single social program can help everyone. This 
paper looks at how the job and training programs fit general social 
policy. In other words, it examines who is helped by these programs 
and who is not.
This chapter gives an introduction to the general social policy 
of the United States. The following chapters address the specific 
area of job and training programs. Chapter 2 covers the history of 
job programs, starting first with their beginning in Europe and moving 
to the present, with emphasis on the job programs in the Roosevelt, 
Johnson, and Reagan administrations. Chapter 3 looks at the 
characteristics of persons involved in the job programs and whether 
the job programs have helped them, that is, were the job programs 
successful. Chapter 3 also examines variables that have affected 
employment conditions in the United States and, therefore, may have 
affected the results of the job programs. In the final chapter, 
solutions, in the forms of new legislation and agency policies, are
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looked at to come up with alternatives that may be used to improve the 
job programs, if improvement is needed.
Present Social Programs
The conditions of relief in the United States are less harsh 
today than they were in the past, but they are still far from 
progressive liberalism. The pattern of relief has been cyclical: 
long periods of restrictiveness are interrupted by short periods of 
liberalization. For more than two decades the relief system created 
by the Social Security Act of 1935 in the United States was 
administered in a way that ensured that as few of the poor as possible 
obtained as little as possible from it. The principle of "less 
eligibility" was reflected in statute, policy, and day-to-day 
practice: not only were grants kept at levels "more severe than that
of the lowest class of laborers who obtain their livelihood by honest 
industry," which meant in some states that the recipients received too 
little to sustain life, but the punishment and degradation that the 
Poor Law authorities were confident would make relief recipients "less 
eligible" had their modern parallel in such practices as mass searches 
and raids of recipients' homes.(l) During the 1960's, however, many 
of these restrictions collapsed and the welfare rolls increased 
greatly. As this occurred, pressures to reorganize the system also 
grew.
A Profile of Americans in Poverty 
As a relative concept, poverty will always be with us because 
inequality is a problem in all societies at all times. No system 
distributes money evenly. Insofar as it can be measured, poverty can
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be defined as a lack of goods and services needed for an "adequate" 
standard of living.(2) Because standards of adequacy vary with both 
the society's general level of well being and public attitudes toward 
deprivation, there is no definition of individual or family basic 
needs that is accepted by everyone. The amount of money income 
necessary to provide for these basic needs is also difficult to 
determine.
The incidence of poverty is related to age, race, sex of family 
head, work status, and educational attainment (see Table 1.1 in 
Appendix). Blacks are three times as likely as whites to be poor 
(32.4% compared to 9.7%). Families headed by women are four and a 
half times as likely to be poor as families headed by males (36.0% 
compared to 7.8%). The greatest concentration of poverty is among 
individuals in female-headed families. Although members of this group 
constitute only 15 percent of the U. S. population, they account for 
nearly half of the poverty population. When the head of the family 
has eight years of schooling or less, the incidence of poverty is 
nearly five times that for families headed by a person with some 
college education.
We can divide the poor into four major groups, which need to be 
helped. They are 1) the elderly, 2) the working-age adults who are 
employed, 3) those of working age who are not employed, and 4) 
children. These groups all share symptoms of low income, but their 
problems vary, and they need different programs to raise them above 
poverty.
The Aged Poor. Traditionally, the elderly have been among 
poverty's most frequent victims. The major cause of poverty among the
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elderly is that most don't hold jobs. While some of the elderly poor 
are willing and able to work regularly, the vast majority cannot do 
so.(3)
The Working Poor. Lack of employment is often the cause of 
poverty, but having employment does not mean that a person will make 
enough money to live or support a family above poverty. "Close to 
half of the 7.6 million family heads who were poor in 1983 worked.
Many single poor persons under 65 years of age were employed at least 
part-time. Some combination of low wages, intermittent unemployment, 
and large families kept these persons and their families in poverty 
despite their work effort."(4)
Levitan states some facts concerning the working poor
1) One-half of poor family heads and almost two-fifths of single 
poor persons worked during 1983 but were unable to climb out 
of poverty.
2) About one-fifth of all poor families, in fact, had two or 
more persons working at some time during the year but 
remained poor.
3) The number of family heads who worked full-time year-round 
but remained poor declined steadily during the 1960s, and at 
a faster rate than the decrease in the total poverty 
population.(5)
Employment and training programs can help those who are 
unemployed. They are designed to smooth the operation of the labor 
market, enhance the productivity of low-income workers, and open 
opportunities for employment and advancement. Obtaining job skills 
and work experience are often essential for workers seeking 
higher-paying jobs or even seeking jobs at all. Effective enforcement 
of protective legislation to eliminate discrimination is also required 
in conjunction with employment and training programs to ensure that 
opportunities for advancement and self-sufficiency are not closed on 
the basis of race, sex, or national origin.(6)
5
The Nonworking Poor. Most of the working-age poor who are 
unemployed are simply not employable. This may be because of personal 
handicaps, child care responsibilities, or lack of suitable job 
opportunities. Illness and family responsibilities are the primary 
barriers to employment among the non-working poor.
Unemployment is a major cause of poverty. Poor family heads 
(both male and female) are about four times more likely to be 
unemployed as nonpoor family heads.(7) Those who are employed face 
other labor market difficulties. Some leave the work force because of 
illness or disability, and others become discouraged by low-paying 
jobs and just drop out of the labor force voluntarily. "More than 
one-third of poor males and almost one in six females aged 22 to 59 
who did not work at all during 1983 were ill or disabled."(8)
Children in Poverty. In 1983 one of every three persons (35.4 
percent) classified as poor was a child under sixteen years of age, 
and nearly one in every four children in the United States lived in 
poverty.(9) Children who live in poverty are a great concern because 
those raised in poor families are often denied opportunities from the 
beginning.
Strategies for Helping the Poor
Poor people need money. Their major problem is a lack of income 
to purchase basic goods and services. The various groups of the poor, 
however, have different needs. The elderly are most concerned about 
medical and nursing home care. Children need health care and basic 
education to assure them opportunities in the future. For all poor 
people, provision of housing, medical care, food and other services 
serves as an important supplement to income maintenance.(10)
These goods and services for the poor have been taken care of by 
various sources. At first, poverty was taken care of by personal, 
family, or local resources. Later organizations, such as 
philanthropies and settlement houses, began to help. It wasn't until 
the end of the 19th century that state and local governments began 
picking up a significant share of the costs.
As industrial states became industrial democracies, poverty 
became an intolerable condition rather than merely an established 
fact.(11) "Historical evidence suggests that relief arrangements are 
initiated or expanded during the occasional outbreaks of civil 
disorder produced by mass unemployment, and are then abolished or 
contracted when political stability is restored."(12) Expansive 
relief policies are established to remove the occurrance of civil 
disorder and restrictions on relief policies are established to 
reinforce the work norm. The chief function of relief arrangements is 
to regulate labor.
The role of government in social welfare has increased, and this 
can be seen in the increase of expenditures of all levels of the 
government for social programs. There are two features that are 
relevant to the modern relief system. They are the enlarged role of 
the national government and the role of electoral institutions. Piven 
and Cloward explain the enlarged role of the national government in 
the following:
The modernization of any society generally entails expansion 
of the power and authority of its national government.
However, when disruptions in the economy lead to 
occupational dislocation, causing widespread distress and 
discontent, it is usually local government that first 
experiences the tremors and moderates them by extending 
relief.(13)
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But as the local relief rolls rise, taxes Increase. This angers the 
local taxpayers and local relief practices break down. When these 
practices break down, the national government is likely to intervene.
The role of electoral institutions is considered because the 
votes of the people serve as a measure of unrest, and the electoral 
contests are intended to exert pressure on political leaders to deal 
with the discontent of the people. The government and the leaders 
then establish programs to deal with the problems.
The first major relief crisis in the United States occurred 
during the Great Depression. The federal government took a small step 
in providing relief with the passage cf the Emergency Relief Act of 
1932. The Emergency Relief Act provided the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation with 300 million dollars to supplement local relief funds 
by making loans to the states. Six months later, the federal 
administration launched a massive emergency relief program. The 
Federal Emergency Relief Act was a measure that reached many of the 
jobless and it did this quickly. For the first time, with the 
establishment of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), 
the federal government assumed responsibility for relief and 
appropriated funds to carry out the responsibility. Half of the money 
was to be spent through matching state grants and the remainder for 
grants to states where the need was greatest and financial resources 
depleted.
There were many movements that occurred after FERA was enacted. 
One such movement was for work relief. Work relief contributed to the 
building of dams, roads, schools, hospitals, and other public
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facilities. It also went far toward moderating civil disorder. The 
people demanded work relief, for they wanted to work.
The expansion of relief in the 1950s again shows that the 
relationship between widespread economic deprivation and the expansion 
of relief arrangements is neither direct nor simple. There was still 
a belief that, although large numbers of people are thrown out of work 
and into poverty, relief should not be given. But if this condition 
also produced disorder with poverty, then the government should allow 
the relief rolls to expand. If the rise in relief in the early 1960s 
was the result of the rise in disorder, then this relationship was 
even more apparant after 1964. As protests, demonstrations, riots, 
and other forms of disorder reached unprecedented heights between 1965 
and 1968, the relief rolls climbed 58 percent, having already risen 31 
percent in the preceding four years.(14)
The federal government had a lot to do with the rise in the 
relief rolls. "Federal intervention occurred along three main lines:
1) The establishment of new services, both public and 
private, that offered the poor information about welfare 
entitlements and the assistance of experts in obtaining 
benefits.
2) The initiation of litigation to challenge a host of 
local laws and policies that kept people off the welfare 
rolls.
3) The support of new organizations of the poor which 
informed people of their entitlement to public welfare 
and mounted pressure on officials to approve their 
applications for assistance."(15)
The federal government did try other ways of dealing with the 
poor than relief-giving. One way was putting money into the black 
ghettos in order to improve the conditions of the blacks living there. 
But other groups in the cities resisted the efforts because they also
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wanted the help. The government can't help everyone at once, and no 
one wants to be one of the groups that has to wait to be helped. An 
example of this is the Model Cities project. Money was divided among 
several cities, so as not to leave someone out. In the end, none of 
the cities benefited much from it. They had limited resources and 
couldn't solve the problems they had. This program ended in a 
failure. Consequently, relief-giving turned out to be the most 
expeditious way to deal with the poor, just as it had been many times 
in the past.(16)
At the end of the 1970s, liberals, independents, and 
conservatives alike were overcome by a pervasive mood of discontent 
with the nation's government.(17) In the 1980s it was believed that 
the government had become oversized, it had done little to solve the 
nation's problems, and it was wasteful. At the beginning of the 1960s 
about 20 percent of the people in the United States lived in poverty. 
With poverty facing from 30 million to 40 million Americans in 1960, 
and near-poverty facing millions more, the government created or 
greatly enlarged many programs during the ensuing Kennedy, Johnson, 
and Nixon years.(18) These programs can be divided into three 
categories: 1) income maintenance aimed largely at aiding the poor
who are outside the work force, 2) programs supplying goods and 
services, and 3) programs to aid the working poor by expanding 
opportunities for work, advancement, and self-sufficiency.
First, income maintenance programs provide the foundation for 
federal assistance to the poor. Because the poor lack adequate 
income, poverty can be best relieved by cash support. The income 
assistance approach has problems, however. There is a possibility
10
that need-based payments to employable persons will diminish their 
incentive to work. Also, income subsidies might not be used for 
providing basic needs, but instead go to other goods and services that 
are not "needed." Finally, political support for income maintenance 
can diminish at any time. The public may agree to pay allowances to 
poor people as they undergo training and yet be unwilling to support 
general relief for the unemployed. Cash maintenance programs 
presently include old age, survivors, and disability insurance 
(OASDI), unemployment insurance, public assistance, veterans' 
pensions, and workers' compensation.(19)
Second, goods and services are also given to the needy as a 
supplement to their cash income. Politically, in-kind benefits are 
preferred over cash benefits. Not only is in-kind aid preferred 
politically, but some people think that the government can judge of 
needs and priorities of the individual than the individual can 
himself. In some instances direct provision of goods is necessary 
because they are not available in the market. Also, the government 
usually can provide a wide variety of goods and services more 
efficiently than the private sector.
Third, the array of federal programs in aid of the poor is 
completed by employment-related efforts to expand work opportunities 
and improve the functioning of labor market institutions.(20) These 
will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapters.
Following the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years public relief 
changed, especially under the Reagan adminitration. President Reagan 
took office in 1981 with the goals of reducing public assistance costs 
and discouraging welfare dependency. His administration quickly
11
sought to focus federal aid on the "truly needy," which it defined as 
those who could not be expected to work and lacked other means of 
support.(21) He rejected policies that used positive financial 
incentives to encourage low-income people to work. Therefore, the 
Reagan reforms fell most heavily upon recipients who combined work 
with welfare. The administration has greatly limited a 1969 law that 
allowed reasonable work expenses. This law allowed the first $30 of 
earnings, and one-third of additional earnings to be disregarded in 
computing monthly welfare benefits. Under the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, the "$30 and 1/3" earned-income disregard 
was restricted to the first four consecutive months of employment.(22) 
Also ceilings were placed on work-related expense deductions and child 
care expense deductions. These provisions have combined to undermine 
work incentives for those on welfare and to reduce federal aid to the 
working poor. The earned-income disregard was a positive incentive 
for people to work. When part of their earned-income was disregarded 
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF WORK PROGRAMS
Relief arrangements deal with disorder, not simply by giving aid 
to the displaced poor, but by granting it on condition that they 
behave in certain ways and sometimes on condition they work. Piven 
and Cloward say that any institution that distributes the resources 
men and women depend upon for survival can readily exert control over 
them.(l) By giving needed assistance, one can easily impose the work 
ethic and enforce work.
This chapter covers the background of job and training programs. 
First, the programs instituted in England in the 18th and 19th 
centuries are discussed. Then the programs of the early 20th century 
are presented. And, finally, the programs of the latter part of the 
20th century are examined.
The arrangements through which relief recipients have been made 
to work vary. Some communities are relatively benevolent; others are 
harsh. Some communities develop one large system; others have several 
different arrangements. Some are efficient; others are inefficient. 
The enforcement of work has been accomplished in two main ways.
First, work was provided under public auspices, whether in the 
recipient's home, in a labor yard, or in a workhouse. Second, work 
was provided in the private market, whether by contracting or
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indenturing the poor to private employers, or through subsidies 
designed to induce employers to hire the poor. And although a relief 
system may at any time use both of these methods of enforcing work, 
one or the other usually becomes predominant, depending on the 
economic conditions that first gave rise to disorder.(2)
Publicly subsidized work is usually used during business 
depressions, when the demand for labor in the private market 
collapses. Arrangements to move the poor into the labor market are 
more likely to be used when changes in markets or technology leave a 
portion of the population unemployed. In the first case, the relief 
system augments a shrunken labor market; in the other, its policies 
and procedures are shaped to overcome the poor fit between 
labor-market requirements and the characteristics of the labor 
force. (3)
European History of Work Relief
Public work is as old as public relief. The municipal relief 
systems which began at the start of the sixteenth century often 
included some form of public works. The favored method of ensuring 
that "youth may be accustomed and brought up in labor and work" 
throughout most of the history of relief was the workhouse.(4) In 
1723, an act of Parliament permitted the local parishes to establish 
workhouses and to refuse aid to those poor who would not work. Within 
ten years, there were said to be about fifty workhouses located in 
London. Sometimes the poor were paid to work in the community or in 
their own homes.
A similar method of enforcing work evolved in England during the 
depression of 1840-1941. As the unemployment level rose, the poor in
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some of the larger cities protested against having to leave their 
families and communities to enter workhouses in order to obtain 
relief. In some places the workhouses were already full. Various 
public spaces, therefore, were "designated as 'labor yards' to which 
the unemployed could come by the day to pick oakum, cut wood, and 
break stone, for which they were paid in food and clothing."(5) The 
method was used periodically throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century. When conditions were severe, many of the poor who 
were able to work were supported in this way.
Different methods of enforcing work are used when the demand for 
labor is steady but maladaptions in the labor supply, caused by 
changes in methods of production, result in unemployment. In such 
circumstances, relief agencies ordinarily channeled the poor directly 
into the private market. For example, the rapid expansion of English 
manufacturing during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries produced a great need for factory workers. But it was not 
easy to get them. Men who had been agricultural laborers, independent 
craftsmen, or workers in domestic industries did not adjust easily to 
the new and alien discipline of the factory.(6)
After a while, men do adjust and the economy does gets better. 
However, when an economic downturn subsides, relief systems are not 
usually abandoned. The welfare rolls are reduced, but the system 
usually remains to provide aid to the aged, the disabled, and others 
who may not have the economic means to provide for themselves.
However, the way in which these were treated suggests a purpose 
different than one of helping them survive. These people were 
degraded for lacking economic value and were placed in the worst areas
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of the workhouses. Such institutions were often said to be the only 
source of aid during times of stability.
Conditions in the workhouse were intended to ensure that no one 
with any other alternatives would seek public aid. The method worked. 
Periods of relief expansion were generally followed by "reform" 
campaigns to abolish all "out-door" aid and restrict relief to those 
who entered the workhouse and these campaigns almost always resulted 
in a sharp reduction in the number of applicants seeking aid.(7)
Early Twentieth Century
Most of the public relief offered during the first three decades 
of the twentieth century was of the "outdoor" or home variety, and 
consisted mostly of grocery slips and coal orders. Institutional care 
was provided for those who did not receive home relief. The 
able-bodied and destitute and those who were unable to work received 
the same type of arduous "made" work, usually on a woodpile, to 
demonstrate that they were not work-shy.(8)
Then, beginning in 1930, the government was confronted with a 
problem of human needs that reached a higher level than had ever been 
reached before. An increasing number of business failures and 
investment losses caused widespread distress. With declining 
agricultural prices and extensive droughts, many in the farm 
population went into poverty. Unemployment deprived millions of 
families of their only way of living.
By December of 1930 approximately 7 million people were 
unemployed. This number doubled in the early part of 1933. Also, the 
number of hours that many people who were still holding jobs had been 
so reduced that their wages would not support their families.
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Although unemployment declined after 1932 and 1933, large-scale 
joblessness persisted throughout the decade. This persistent mass 
unemployment made relief a major problem and forced the adoption of 
new relief methods.(9)
Federal Emergency Relief Administration
Although federal relief committees designed to encourage and 
stimulate State and local action were formed in 1930 and 1931, and 
some federally owned surplus wheat and cotton were distributed early 
in 1932, substantial Federal aid in meeting the problem did not come 
until the passage of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act in July 
1932.(10) Under this act the federal government set up a relief fund 
of $300 million that the state and local governments could borrow from 
at 3 percent interest.
By the time Franklin Roosevelt took office in March 1933, the 
$300 million loan fund had been practically exhausted. Federal action 
on a large scale was needed. The question was no longer whether the 
federal government should participate in financing relief, but rather 
how this participation was to be appropriated.
In May 1933 the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) 
was created. It started out with a $500 million fund for distribution 
to the states. These were not loans. Instead, they were direct 
grants. Burns and Williams say that the main task of the FERA was to 
allocate federal money to the states on the basis of need and 
financial resources, and to issue broad rules and regulations 
accompanying the grant to insure minimum relief standards and the 
proper expenditure of Federal funds.(11)
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During the period of FERA grants (1933-1935) federal relief 
policy was in a formative stage. It was a period of experimentation 
and formulation of relief policies. During this period relief 
programs and techniques shifted considerably. Underlying all these 
changes, however, was a unifying tendency. There was a constant trend 
toward differentiation of the relief groups. Guided by this 
principle, FERA emphasized the development of work programs for the 
employable poor and the institution of special programs designed to 
meet the particular needs of various groups on the relief rolls, such 
as farmers, teachers, transient persons, and youth.(12)
The experience gained under FERA was important in laying the 
foundation for a more permanent federal security program in 1935.
This program, although modified in certain respects from time to time, 
has continued in active operation and includes two principal parts:
(1) the Social Security program embracing unemployment compensation 
and old-age benefit systems, and public assistance for certain 
categories of needy unemployables, and (2) a program of work projects 
financed in whole or in part by Federal, funds and giving employment to 
a large but varying proportion of the needy able-bodied.(13)
From the beginning of the FERA program several major objectives 
were continuously stressed by the agency. One of the principal 
reasons for the establishement of federal grants for relief was that 
the relief funds in most of the communities were insufficient. 
Therefore, an objective was to encourage and make possible the 
provision of more adequate relief throughout the country.
The broad relief problem in 1933 was the result of many 
previously existing kinds of relief problems. The number in need was
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made up of "the unemployed, the underemployed, transients, destitute 
farmers and farm workers, the aged, mothers with dependent children, 
youth, stranded rural groups, and other special types."(14) Each of 
the above groups was itself made up of widely differing types of 
individuals. Each group had needs that differed from the needs of the 
others. Farmers on relief were poor for a variety of reasons. Debts, 
barren soil, severe droughts, and lack of equipment, seed, and stock 
were among the special factors intensifying the troubles caused by low 
agricultural prices.
The differentiation of the various relief groups and the 
establishment of special programs and policies were designed to fit 
individual needs and were taken care of as far as conditions 
permitted. A major objective of FERA was the development of 
work-relief programs for the employable workers on relief rolls. In 
some areas this merely involved the continuationn, revision, and 
expansion of existing local work-relief programs. A direct-relief 
program was instituted for those unable to work or for those for whom 
work could not be found. The rural rehabilitation program of FERA was 
created to care for those who lived in rural areas.
Work Projects Administration
Most of the employment between 1935 and 1945 was provided by the 
Work Projects Administration. "About 3,600,000 persons were receiving 
employment under the various Federal work programs in December 1940.
Of this total about 1,859,000 persons were employed under the program 
operated by the Work Projects Administration."(15) The remainder were 
being given work by the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Public Works
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Administration, and other federal agencies cooperating in furnishing 
work for the unemployed.
At that time it had been "erroneously assumed in some quarters 
that economic recovery would somehow of itself eliminate the relief 
problem or reduce it to extremely small proportions."(16) This 
assumption ignores the fact that a very large proportion of those now 
receiving relief or work relief would still remain in need even if 
there were an increase in the number of jobs available.
For example, about 50 percent of the 5 million households 
receiving public aid in June 1940 fall into a class that cannot hope 
to benefit by future increases in employment.(17) In this large group 
are those who can't work, such as the aged, the blind, and children. 
They receive aid under the public assistance provisions of the Social 
Security Act and under the general relief programs of the state and 
local governments. Burns and Williams say that some form of aid will 
continue to be the major, if not the only, source of income for such 
groups; the need for a permanent program for this segment of the 
relief population appears obvious.(18)
Later Twentieth Century
During the 1950s, unemployment kept rising. Late in that decade, 
congressional leaders, many of whom had lived through the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, were quick to see upcoming danger but they 
were slow to find a program that would help the sagging labor market. 
Some supported a short-run program that would immediately start to 
better the condition, while others stressed a flexible, ongoing 
program that could be adapted to different locations and situations.
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They all agreed that the program would have to take the short- and 
long-run views In order to be effective.
Programs that provide opportunities for self-support and escape 
from poverty are important in eliminating poverty in the long run. 
Those in need of self-help programs are found in a variety of 
situations. Some of the unemployed lack the skills to compete 
effectively in the labor market, and others are qualified workers 
unable to locate a demand for their skill. There are also some who 
are not counted among the unemployed. They are the ones who are too 
discouraged by their failure to find work to continue to look. In 
addition, there are those who are employed but are still poor. They 
are part-time workers who need full-time work to keep them out of 
poverty and full-time workers who are employed at such low wages that 
even full-time work does not raise them above poverty. These 
underemployed and low earners, when added to the unemployed and 
discouraged, constitute the subemployed. The subemployment rate gives 
a more realistic indication of the need for employment and training 
services.(19)
It was in the latter part of the 20th century that the government 
began to realize that programs were not only needed to help the 
unemployed, but also the subemployed. Publicly funded efforts to 
increase employment were revived in the sixties as part of the 
antipoverty efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
During this period the main emphasis was on providing training and 
work experience for the economically disadvantaged. This was the goal 
of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. In sharp contrast to the
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lack of federal attention to manpower after the Depression, the 1960s 
were marked by a proliferation of programs.(20)
The severe hardships of economically depressed regions were 
addressed by the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 that channeled job 
training and industrial revitalization grants into the nation's 
poorest states and communities. Soon after, some workers who lost 
their jobs because of automation could obtain retraining assistance 
through the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962. The Public 
Works Acceleration Act of 1962 authorized nearly a billion dollars for 
building and maintenance projects in communities experiencing high and 
sustained levels of unemployment. Spending on these experimental 
programs remained modest, however. In 1963 federal training programs 
cost only $64 million.(21)
Manpower Development and Training Act
Throughout the 1960s many different employment and training 
measures were authorized by federal lawmakers and administered by 
public and private organizations. The principal legislation— the 
Manpower Development and Training Act and the Economic Opportunity 
Act— housed more than a dozen programs for high school dropouts, 
inner-city youth, delinquents, welfare recipients, and older 
workers.(22) These different measures had in common an emphasis on 
aiding disadvantaged citizens with limited education, skills, and 
experience.
These Employment and training programs acquired image problems 
during the 1960s. Unlike unemployment insurance or public works 
projects that benefit a cross section of unemployed Americans, War on 
Poverty programs were aimed at the poor, minorities, and residents of
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depressed urban communities. The participants made no financial 
contribution to their programs. Most were not even taxpayers, and 
many had never worked. Baumer and Van Horn said that "from the 
standpoint of some critics, the War on Poverty rewarded undeserving 
people whose chronic unemployment was of their own making."(23)
Two major laws were passed in the 1960s. They are the Manpower 
Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 and the Equal Opportunity 
Act (EOA) of 1964. After them, various other categorical programs 
were created. These programs paid a living allowance to participants 
while providing a variety of services— vocational training, work 
experience, subsidized employment in both the public and private 
sectors, remedial education, supportive services, and placement 
assistance.(24) The various programs of the 1960s had different ideas 
on how the government should attack unemployment and poverty. Some 
programs were based on the assumption that the individual could be 
changed so that he could fit into the social and economic system. 
Others focused on changing institutions to better accommodate the 
needs of the individuals.
During the early 1960s the Manpower Development and Training Act 
was designed to serve those who had been displaced by automation.
Soon the emphasis shifted away from these workers, however, and the 
urban poor became the principal focus of governmental policy.(25)
Public Services Employment Program
The Public Service Employment (PSE) program of the federal 
government was enacted by Congress in 1973 and was revised several 
times. PSE had three main goals. Like the Works Progress 
Administration of the depression era, it was supposed to provide jobs
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In a time of high unemployment. It was also "intended to give 
employment experience to, and thereby increase the long-run job 
prospects of, the 'structurally unemployed,' persons who have trouble 
finding jobs even in the best of times because they lack skill and 
education."(26) And it was intended to help local governments provide 
needed services.
The need to balance these three major objectives caused 
controversy in Washington. It also caused friction between the 
Department of Labor and the local and state governments that were 
using the money that the agency distributed. State and local 
officials were most interested in providing needed services, both 
through government agencies and private nonprofit agencies, whereas 
federal officials generally focused on the goal of reducing 
unemployment. A balance was reached. This balance was a bargain 
among the different levels of government. Local and state officials 
said they were willing to spend the extra time and effort needed to 
supervise and train the hard-to-employ people if they saw some 
benefits that maintained or expanded services in their areas.
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Following the rise in unemployment in 1969-70, the Emergency 
Employment Act of 1971 authorized a two-year Public Employment Program 
(PEP) that provided funds to local governments to hire temporary 
workers. The groups singled out for emphasis under PEP were members 
of families with incomes below the poverty level, Vietnam veterans, 
and younger and older workers.
Following this, Congress passed the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA) in December 1973, and the act took effect in July
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1974. CETA was designed primarily to consolidate programs aimed at
various areas and population groups into a single block grant. This
approach was consistent with the Nixon administration's goal of
simplifying grant-in-aid programs and giving more discretion to state
and local governments, which were to decide for themselves how to
spend employment and training money. PEP was to be phased out and
replaced by title II of CETA, which provided for a public service
employment program to combat structural unemployment.
A state or local jurisdiction or part of a jurisdiction was 
eligible for a title II grant if it was classified as 
experiencing 'substantial unemployment'— a rate of 6.5 
percent or more for three consecutive months. People were 
eligible to participate if they were unemployed or 
underemployed— that is, working only part time for economic 
reasons or working full time but earning less than a 
poverty-level income. The funds were to be paid to 
organizations that the act refers to as 'prime 
sponsors.'(27)
In December 1974, just half a year after CETA went into effect, 
Congress responded to the deepening recession by adding a new section 
to the act. The Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 
1974 established title VI of CETA. "To be eligible under title VI a 
person had to have been unemployed for thirty days (or fifteen days if 
the local unemployment rate was more than 7 percent). By June 1975 
title VI of CETA was providing jobs for 155,000 persons; the total of 
titles II and VI, plus the remainder of the PEP program that was still 
not phased out, brought the overall enrollment to 310,00 persons."(28) 
One of the most important purposes of the public service 
employment program under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
of 1973 had been to create new jobs in order to put unemployed persons 
to work during times of recession or slow economic growth. Because 
CETA let the local governments make most of the spending decisions,
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there was a concern that these governments might replace locally 
financed positions with federally funded ones. If they did this, the 
result would have been more like revenue sharing than a job creation 
program.
Congress modified the program in the fall of 1978 when it 
reauthorized the CETA legislation. Fiscal conservatism was rising at 
the time, and the PSE program was a natural target of economizers for 
several reasons. It was one of the biggest and fastest growing of all 
federal grant-in-aid programs. Also "local news media were uncovering 
instances of mismanagement, such as ineligible participants or cases 
of nepotism. And critics continued to suspect that PSE funds were 
simply replacing local spending."(29) From the start CETA had 
contained a "maintenance of effort" clause that bans the use of CETA 
money for displacement purposes, and the Department of Labor had 
issued increasingly stringent regulations on this point.(30) These 
regulations were very difficult to enforce. The field associates did 
report, however, that local government officials generally were at 
least aware of the ban on displacement.(31)
Under the law enacted that year the PSE program that had been 
known as title II was renumbered title II-D and aimed more narrowly at 
persons suffering long-term unemployment for structural reasons. It 
was also changed in order to put more emphasis on training and 
placement to help participants find permanent jobs. The 1978 
reauthorization also set limits on the wages that could be paid to PSE 
participants for any position. There was a 510,000 maximum for all 
positions. There were also limits on the length of time a person 
could remain in the PSE program. The maximum was eighteen months,
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although the Department of Labor could grant waivers to individual 
sponsors.
In March 1978 enrollment in titles II and VI reached a peak as a 
result of being bolstered by President Carter's 1977 economic stimulus 
package, which added $4 billion to the fiscal year 1978 budget for 
PSE.(32) Over 750,000 persons were employed, equal to 10 percent of 
all unemployed persons in the labor force. Outlays reached $5.6 
billion in fiscal year 1978. Since then the size of the program has 
been reduced. The average PSE enrollment in fiscal 1978 was 680,000; 
the average for fiscal 1979 was 557,000. At the end of fiscal year 
1980, 328,000 were enrolled.
Two cities reported:
CETA has demonstrated to the city that hiring disadvantaged 
workers can be done successfully if attention is paid to 
problems of management. Perhaps the most important service 
provided by CETA has been the 'sensitivity' training program 
which has been provided for managers and foremen on the 
worksites in which CETA employees have been located. This 
training, according to observers, has 'spilled over' and 
generally improved attitudes toward minority and 
hard-to-employ recruitment.(33)
The target groups for CETA were low-income and long-term 
unemployed. It had no specific program for dislocated workers.
Program activities included work experience, on-the-job training, 
classroom training, supportive services, and remedial education.
There were no restrictions on the use of funds to pay wages or 
stipends to program enrollees.
The state's role was to administer programs in areas falling 
outside CETA prime sponsorships, to administer special grants 
programs, and to appoint a statewide advisory council. The service 
delivery areas were units of local government with a population of
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100,000. The local program management was carried out by the chief 
elected official of the local political jurisdiction. Local advisory 
councils, who are appointed by elected officials, offer advice but do 
not approve or disapprove plans.
The federal government's principal responsibility was for 
oversight of the system, including review and assessment of activities 
and delivery of technical assistance. The federal government was also 
responsible for research and demonstration projects and for management 
of national programs for Indians, migrant workers, youth, the Job 
Corps, and other programs.
The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 signaled 
dramatic changes in the nation's approach to helping the unemployed. 
Reagan brought to the White House traditional conservative views to 
limit the public sector's role in helping unemployment. What the 
government could do best was to do less and help the unemployed by 
leaving more money in the hands of investors who could create lasting 
jobs in the private sector. In the president's view, the principal 
causes of high unemployment were the "excessive" government spending 
and taxing policies of the past 30 years.(34)
Job creation and training programs were high on his list of 
measures that hadn't worked and were beyond the legitimate scope of 
government. The president proposed to dismantle or diminish the 
entire system of public service employment programs, public works 
projects, and training programs for youths and adults that had been 
built up with bipartisan support since the early 1960s.
Few programs under the employment and training policy escaped the 
president's cuts. He proposed the immediate termination of the $3.1
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billion public service employment (PSE) program, public works projects 
funded by the Economic Development Administration, and employment tax 
credits.(35) He also favored a reduction in and phasing out over a 
five-year period of the remaining job training measures under CETA.
According to Reagan, most government strategies for the 
unemployed were not only ineffective but also counterproductive. He 
suggested a subminimum wage for youth during summer months, hoping 
this would encourage employers to hire more young workers. He also 
said he would reduce extended unemployment benefits and impose higher 
taxes on unemployment insurance payments because he felt this might 
induce beneficiaries to look more actively for employment.
Anticipating that Congress would approve Reagan's termination of 
public service jobs, the Labor Department froze hiring nationwide. 
State and local administrators were instructed to phase out 
approximately 300,000 federally funded workers between March and 
September 1981.(36) The department announced that it would make every 
effort to assure that PSE jobholders obtained full-time, unsubsidized 
employment. The entire employment and training system was asked to 
make placing public service employees into permanent jobs of the 
highest priority.
PSE's sudden death took place on the heels of cutbacks that began 
in 1979. Enrollment peaked in 1978 when federal funds paid for more 
than 725,000 jobs nationwide. By 1981 the CETA workforce had dropped 
to 300,000; by 1982 it was zero. Program managers had only four 
options. Federally subsized employees could be 1) absorbed by their 
employers at a cost to local resources; 2) placed in private sector 
jobs; 3) transferred to CETA training programs that had not been
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eliminated; or 4) left unemployed and therefore eligible for various 
forms of governmental support, including unemployment insurance, food 
stamps, and welfare.(37) The results of the reemployment effort were 
disappointing. As of September 1981, the Labor Department reported 
that nationwide only 38 percent of the 300,000 laid-off workers had 
obtained jobs.(38)
The results of the reemployment drive are even less encouraging 
when the nature of postprogram employment is considered. Of those who 
found work, only half obtained permanent full-time jobs; the rest were 
evenly divided between temporary positions and part-time positions. 
Moreover, a high percentage of the jobs held by former PSE enrollees 
were not located in the profit-making sector, two-thirds of those who 
found new positions were hired by public sector organizations.(39)
Reagan's proposals for shrinking the government's role in helping 
the employed were only partially successful. CETA's public service 
employment was dropped from the fiscal 1982 budget, and federal 
unemployment benefits were temporarily curtailed, but the president's 
other initiatives were not approved. Less than a year after urging 
sweeping cutbacks, Reagan reversed positions almost completely. The 
proposed higher taxes on unemployment benefits were thrown out. The 
president urged continuation of federally funded extended employment 
benefits. He also endorsed federal job training programs and backed 
tax credits for businesses that hire the long-term unemployed.
Finally, he signed two job creation measures costing more than the $10 
billion. The only Reagan proposal that was still on the original list 
was the lower minimum wage for teenagers, but Congress showed no
interest
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Job Training and Partnership Act 
The president had not changed his mind about how the government 
should deal with unemployment, but politics forced him to change his 
positions. Congress was not likely to support him, if he kept his 
originals positions. Sharply rising unemployment pushed Congress to 
enact government relief packages, and the president was virtually 
powerless to stop them.
When Reagan took office in 1981, unemployment stood at 7 
percent; inflation was around 12 percent and had been in 
double digits for 2 consecutive years— something that hadn't 
occurred for 60 years. The prime interest rate had topped 
20 percent and mortgage rates had risen to 15 percent or 
more, all but halting home purchases.(40)
The president's attack on inflation through reduced spending and taxes
was received favorably by the public and many politicians.
Less than two years later, the inflation rate went down to 4.4
percent. Reagan and his advisors predicted that their strategy of
lower taxes and reduced growth in government outlays would lead to
lower unemployment during 1982. Instead of declining, however,
unemployment shot upward during 1982, from 8.6 percent in January to
10.8 percent in December, for an annual average of 9.7 percent.(41)
The nation went into a deep recession and experienced the highest
unemployment in 40 years. By the end of the year, Congress had
forced the president to abandon his opposition to job creation and
training programs. In October he signed the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) to replace what remained of the CETA training programs.
The target groups of JTPA are low-income and long-term
unemployed. They were 60 percent adult and 40 percent youth. Program
activities include on-the-job training, classroom training, and other
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activities that lead to jobs in the private sector. There are several 
restrictions in JTPA. Seventy percent of the funds must go for 
training. There were restrictions on the use of funds for work 
experience. Public service jobs are prohibited and payment of 
stipends or wages to trainees is restricted.
The state is responsible for overall program coordination and 
monitoring of state and local programs. The state also approves or 
disapproves local plans and determines the areas that will deliver 
local programs. It also administers state level programs for older 
workers and dislocated workers and appoints the state advisory 
council.
The service delivery areas for JTPA include units of local 
government in partnership with Private Industry Councils (PICs), with 
a population over 200,000 or serving a substantial area of the labor 
market.(42) Local program management is carried out by PICs composed 
of representatives from the private sector, as the majority partner, 
and from labor, education, and other groups. They are appointed by 
local elected officials and plans must be approved by PICs and local 
elected officials.
The JTPA puts greater reliance on private sector placement, low 
training costs, and local autonomy. Without funds for training 
programs it has become more difficult for the poor to get help from 
training programs. Without the training, it is more difficult for the 
poor to obtain work. It appears, therefore, that the JTPA has 
significantly altered the direction of employment and training 
programs away from helping the more disadvantaged workers.
The following chapter will look more closely at some of the job 
and training programs just discussed to see whether these programs 
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CHAPTER 3
EVALUATION OF WORK PROGRAMS
Many job and training programs have come and gone. Since there 
are so many, this paper will evaluate just two of the major programs 
that have been implemented: Manpower Development and Training Act and 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. To measure the results of 
these programs, the number of people living in poverty before, during, 
and after each program was implemented was examined, as were the 
levels of employment.
One must be aware, however, that these measures may not be 
showing the actual results of the job and training programs.
Underlying factors, which will be discussed later in this chapter, may 
cause certain appearances to be deceiving. This is why different 
people have examined the same data and reached different conclusions. 
It depends on which factors each person decides to use in their 
analysis.
Because most people look only at poverty levels and unemployment 
levels to determine the success of a program, this chapter will do the 
same. Later in the chapter other factors are discussed and examined 




The Results of Job Programs
How successful were the job programs in reducing unemployment, 
and as a result, in reducing poverty? To determine this, each program 
must be looked at on the basis of labor force and employment.
Following is an analysis of a few of the better known job programs, 
beginning with the Works Progress Administration.
Manpower Development and Training Act
As was mentioned previously, the Manpower Development and 
Training Act was established in 1962. Unemployment rates decreased 
when the MDTA was implemented, as can be seen in Table 3.1 (see 
Appendix). Not only did unemployment decrease when MDTA was 
implemented, it continued to decrease in the years following, whereas 
before 1962, unemployment rose. This occurred for all groups of 
people. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the percent distribution of families 
by income level. When looking at Table 3.2, you can see that between 
1962 and 1963 there was a decrease in the percent of families with an 
income under $3,000. Of course, when looking at the table closer, you 
will see that prior to 1963 the percent of families with an income 
under $3,000 was already decreasing. However, the amount of decrease 
from 1956 to 1961 ranged from 0.0 to 0.4 percentage points, whereas 
the amount'of decrease from 1962 to 1963 was 0.9 percentage points.
The amount of decrease for blacks and other races was lower (0.8 
percentage points) than the decrease for whites (1.0 percentage point) 
at this time (see Table 3.3 in Appendix).
Other people have conducted analyses of the MDTA. Analyses of 
the federal government's job-training programs under the earlier MDTA 
have found that these programs produced effective results. By 1965,
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seven of ten graduates of MDTA training programs had been placed in 
the type of job for which they had been trained, including 94 percent 
of the participants completing on-the-job training.(1) The overall 
dropout rate was less than that of the nation's high schools. Some 
estimates indicated that the taxes paid by the newly employed MDTA 
graduates would repay the costs of their training in five years.
Nearly every study of the MDTA programs published after 1965 through 
to the establishment of CETA found similar results. Of the 
assessments using cost-benefit analysis, the total benefits arising 
from the programs exceeded total costs by more than 100 percent.(2)
Measured by official government statistics, poverty declined 
markedly in the decade of the 1960s. "In 1960 nearly 40 million 
persons, or 22 percent of the population, were classified as poor 
based on the official poverty index. By 1969, this number had been 
reduced to approximately 24 million, or 12 percent of the 
population."(3) Most of this progress occurred during the second half 
of the decade, when jobs were plentiful and the federal government 
mounted special efforts to extend the gains of an expanding economy to 
the ranks of the poor.
Most studies have discovered that the results of on-the-job 
training programs are even superior to those of the in-house or 
institutional programs. Most of cost-effectiveness studies on the 
manpower training programs suggest that these programs benefited not 
only hundreds of thousands of participants but also the nation and the 
taxpayer.
Yet the relative stability of the numbers and characteristics of 
the poor mask considerable movement of persons into and out of
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poverty. A study of 5,000 families by the University of Michigan 
Survey Research Center found that from 1969 to 1970, during which time 
the poverty rate averaged 12 percent, one-quarter of the sample joined 
the ranks of the poor for at least one of the years studied.(A) This 
finding suggests that a large segment of the American population is 
susceptible to at least temporary deprivation, and that poverty is 
more pervasive than it appears when looking at annual poverty rates. 
Yet for most households, poverty is not a long-term affliction. "Of 
the families in the Michigan survey exposed to poverty, a majority 
were poor for only one or two years during the period. Only 2.6 
percent of the total sample remained poor for more than seven of the 
ten years studied."(5) If this is, indeed, the case, then the job 
programs may be helping those people who might have been off welfare 
without MDTA. However, we do not know if MDTA did actually help or 
whether the percent of long-term unemployed may have been larger 
without MDTA.
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
As was stated in Chapter 2, CETA was implemented in 1973. In 
Table 3.4, you can see that unemployment greatly increased between 
1970 and 1975. The results were the same for all groups.
In Tables 3.5 and 3.6, it is impossible to determine the affect 
of CETA because the information was not comparable. Prior to 1970, 
the money income levels were measured in 1967 dollars and after 1970, 
the money income levels were measured in 1985 dollars.
Therefore, this work looked for studies that others had done on 
CETA. The most thorough study on the results of governmental programs 
over the long term was a study on the effects of job training and job
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creation under the CETA. This study, the first of its kind, examined 
the employment careers of people for the five years subsequent to 
their CETA employment, covering the histories of 1,136 workers in and 
around the Baltimore area from 1973 through 1978.(6) Most of the CETA 
participants were members of groups traditionally hard hit by 
unemployment.
The study, carried out by Johns Hopkins University, discovered
that the employment of CETA participants rose significantly following
participation in the CETA program. Employment also continued to
improve over the long run. With roughly $24 billion, CETA became one
of the more successful job-preparing efforts. They trained over 18
million workers. According to Schwartz,
of those participants who had not been employed at all 
during the entire year preceding entry into CETA, 40 percent 
became employed immediately upon terminating the program, 
and 56 percent were employed within six months. Of all 
program participants, 48 percent found jobs immediately 
after leaving the program, 59 percent within one month, and 
66 percent after six months. After five years, only six 
percent of the former CETA participants were looking for 
jobs.(7)
The findings of the Baltimore study also show a significant
increase in the wage levels of the CETA participants.
Comparing the wages of the participants employed before 
entering CETA with the real wages (after discounting for 
inflation) earned by the same participants after completing 
the program indicates an increase of 15 percent. Starting 
at 70 percent of the average wage in the Baltimore area,
CETA participants had advanced to 89 percent of the average 
wage by 197 8.(8)
The results of the only long-term analysis of a public jobs program 
suggest that the program was quite successful and that the program's 
impact did not diminish.(9)
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However, not all CETA programs brought the high level of success 
found by the Johns Hopkins team. An extensive review of the 
short-term effects of more than two dozen CETA programs across the 
nation, undertaken on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences, 
found mixed results. Nevertheless, while calling for amendments to 
tighten the CETA job placement function and to place more emphasis on 
the severely disadvantaged, the report concluded that the overall 
results favored CETA and called for its reauthorization.(10)
CETA had many problems at the beginning. There were many people 
who did not support the program. Some people felt that the state and 
local governments were using this program to pay for jobs that already 
existed and that they weren't creating new jobs. They felt it was 
becoming a form of revenue sharing. There were also problems of 
mismanagement in some programs. Because there were so many CETA 
agencies, it was hard to keep an eye on each one. In other agencies, 
officials were abusing their power by giving out benefits in public 
service employment.(11) Some people complained that, although 80 
percent of all U. S. jobs were with private firms, only 15 percent of 
CETA's clients received private sector jobs. The CETA program had 
also become very costly.
All these problems were looked at when it came time for CETA's 
reauthorization in 197 8. Many changes were made in CETA's 
reauthorization. Ceilings were put on wages so that agencies could 
not hire professionals and pay them with CETA funds. There was a 
creation of an advisory group of private employers. There were also 
stricter eligibility standards. These changes obviously affected
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CETA's outcome. They reduced the number of problems that CETA had and 
made it more successful.
Factors That Affect the Job and Training Programs 
Having looked at each of the past and present job and training 
programs, one must keep in mind that the number of persons living in 
poverty and the level of unemployment are only two ways in which these 
programs can be evaluated. There are several factors which can affect 
the numbers used to evaluate the programs and, as a result, can change 
the perceived outcomes of the programs. Besides the government job 
and training programs, personal characteristics, the market, the 
economy, labor forces, industrialization and modernization 
(technology), and the service industry have all had a part in 
determining the number of persons living in poverty and the 
unemployment levels. Following is a summary of each of these factors 
with reliance on research done by others.
Characteristics of People in Poverty 
There are basically two types of poverty indices: static and 
relative poverty indices. These two indices address two different 
concerns. A static measure like the official index reveals how the 
fortunes of low-income households have changed and demonstrates 
whether or not we have made substantial progress in lifting families 
above a fixed minimum income standard. A relative poverty measure 
gauges shifts in income distribution.
As was mentioned in chapter 1, the incidence of poverty is 
related to age, race, sex of family head, work status, and educational 
attainment. The demographic characteristics of the poor changed
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significantly during the past generation. Two phenomena are 
particularly striking: the increased number of persons living in 
female—headed housesholds and the decreased number of elderly poor 
(see Table 3.7 in Appendix). Throughout the last decade, the 
prospects of older Americans have improved. At the same time that the 
aged population increased, the number of aged poor dropped from 4.7 
million in 1970 to 3.7 million in 1983.(12) The decline in the number 
of elderly poor has reduced poverty among those 65 and over to an 
amount lower than for those under 65. Credit for this downward trend 
in poverty levels for the aged is due largely to more generous social 
security benefits, which are indexed for inflation, and the growth of 
private and veterans' pensions.(13)
Unemployment
Our understanding of the level and causes of poverty also can be 
enhanced through the use of measures that link poverty and employment 
data and thus provide a more comprehensive picture of labor market 
conditions and problems. The official poverty index alone fails to 
reveal whether the poor suffer deprivation as a result of low wages, 
lack of job opportunities, or nonparticipation in the labor force.(14)
One of the main causes of poverty is unemployment. The duration 
of unemployment is greater for all unemployed in times of high 
unemployment. As the level of unemployment drops, the average 
duration may lengthen, especially as those longest out of work may 
take longer to obtain employment. During this time and while 
unemployment is low, the concentration of long-term unemployment among 
certain groups is highest. Following are breakdowns by which 
employment factors can be categorized.(15)
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Geographical. The duration of unemployment is greater in areas 
of high unemployment, particularly if the high level has persisted. 
These areas are usually generally more depressed or poorer than the 
rest of the country. They tend to be old industrial regions or 
undeveloped rural areas. Some may be a mixture of both.
Seasonal. Seasonal unemployment tends to be highest in depressed 
areas characterized by underemployment and low labor force 
participation rates.
Underemployment. In rural areas underemployment and long-term 
unemployment may go together, and be strongly affected by seasonal 
factors. Their joint impact which is usually underestimated by 
official statistics is exacerbated by the lact of job opportunities in 
other industries.
Sex. Men experience higher long-term unemployment rates and form 
a larger part of the long-term unemployed. They are also more likely 
than women to experience cumulative recurrent unemployment. This may 
be so because, in the past, not as many women as man held jobs. Also, 
women may not have started looking for a job when they lost the one 
they had if their husbands had jobs. Whereas, if a man lost his job, 
he would immediately begin looking for another one.
Age. The long-term unemployment rate increases sharply in the 5 
to 10 years before the usual retirement age. The unemployed 
proportion long out of work increases slowly with age. In regions and 
times of increased unemployment, the long-term unemployment rates for 
all age-groups are higher, but those for older workers still remain 
highest.
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Marital and household or family status. Married men with 
children to support are least likely to become long-term unemployed 
although because of their greater number they still form the majority. 
Single and other non-married experience more long-term unemployment 
and their rates are less susceptible to movements in the unemployment 
rate. Rates for married men are highest in depressed areas or times 
of increased unemployment.
Occupation and skill. The lower the skill the greater the chance 
of long-term unemployment as well as unemployment. Unskilled 
laborers, service workers, and those without a regular job are most 
vulnerable.
Industry. Workers in durable goods and manufacturing, 
transportation and public utilities, mining and public administration 
tend to have the highest rates of long-term unemployment. Those in 
agriculture, construction and building and other seasonal industries 
are most likely to experience recurrent unemployment.
Inter-industrial differences widen during the winter.
Education. The lower the educational attainment the greater the 
chance of long-term unemployment, at any age level. Lack of education 
appears to be particularly restricting among younger job seekers, and 
to be a bigger handicap when unemployment is high.
Race and minority. Particular minorities are not only 
handicapped by their poorer education and training, but also by 
discrimination as well.
Disability. Disability or work limitation is strongly associated 
with long-term unemployment. The extent of disability or work 
limitation is probably greater than is at present recognized. The
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proportion of long-term unemployed who are disabled increases with 
age.
The Market and Economy
Even without change, market incentives may not be enough to 
compel all people at all times to do the particular work required of 
them. Incentives may be too meager and erratic, or people may not be 
sufficiently socialized to respond to them properly. To be sure, the 
productivity of a fully developed capitalist economy would allow wages 
and profits sufficient to entice the population to work; and in a 
fully developed capitalist society, most people would also be reared 
to want what the market holds out to them.(16) They would expect to 
get what they needed to live on from the marketplace.
Capitalism.evolved slowly and spread slowly. During most of this 
evolution, the market provided meager rewards for most workers, and 
none at all for some. For some this is still so. And during most of 
this evolution, large sectors of the laboring classes were not fully 
socialized to the market way of doing things. The relief system has 
made an important contribution toward overcoming the weaknesses in the 
capacity of the market to direct and control men.
Piven and Cloward say that change is basic to capitalist economic 
arrangements and that change, fluctuation, and unemployment are 
chronic features of capitalism.(17) But sometimes these changes cause 
many people to suffer. Examples of these changes are economic 
downturns, depressions, or natural disasters. At the onset of these 
changes, there is little that the people can do. No matter how hard
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they may work at getting ahead, it does not mean much when outside 
forces work against them.
In the 1930s the problem of poverty among employable people came 
about because of the failure of the economic system to achieve full 
employment. About one-half of the households receiving public aid in 
June 1940 had an employable member. The possibility of reducing 
unemployment depended on the success of efforts designed to expand the 
industrial system.
In addition to such factors as seasonal, frictional, and cyclical 
unemployment, there were in the 1930s such influences as "loss of 
foreign trade, decline in the rate of population growth, the changing 
nature of technological advances, and the retarding influences of an 
economy which has reached a high degree of industrial maturity. All 
these factors help to explain why the economic system during the 1930s 
failed to expand to make full use of its labor and other 
resources."(18)
Business depressions are not a new development in this country. 
During the depressions prior to 1929, many unemployed workers were 
poor and some of them received limited public or private aid for short 
periods. However, these conditions were regarded as temporary and the 
need for changes in the relief methods was not recognized.
In all instances these earlier depressions were followed within a 
year or two by a period of recovery and expansion. Expansive forces 
in the economy opened up new investment opportunities, and enabled the 
economic system to provide new employment and to bring depression 
conditions to an end within a short period of time. While a certain 
amount of unemployment existed at all times, an impetus to expansion
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was provided by new industries, a rapidly growing population, the 
development of new territories and markets, and a growing export 
trade.(19) Although the labor supply increased and technological 
displacement of worker was common, the total demand for labor grew as 
the economic system expanded. Under these circumstances unemployment 
was not a serious problem. Nor did factors such as old age, 
dependency of children, and rural destitution assume the proportions 
of a national problem, that they did in the 1930s.(20)
A sharp distinction can be drawn between the earlier and 
temporaray dislocations and the economic difficulties of the decade 
following 1929. This decade was marked by a failure of the economy to 
expand as it always had before. Each of the decades following 1900 
showed increases, following an upward trend that existed in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. In 1932, however, the index dropped 
below its 1914 level; the entire decade of the 1930s averaged 236, 
only 19 percent above the average for 1910-1919.(21)
The measurement of industrial production on a per capita basis 
shows the failure of the economy to expand because it takes into 
account the effect of a change in population. Per capita output in 
1929 was twice that of 1900; output in 1900 was twice that of the 
1870s.(22) After 1929, however, the trend reversed.
Of course, 1932 was a year of unparalleled depression. Yet for 
the 10-year period of the 1930s per capita average output was 138, 
compared with an average of 172 during the 1920s.(23) Thus, this 
decade represented a marked break in the long upward trend in 
production which included the industrial growth.
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A comparison of figures on industrial production and on the labor 
supply gives some information on the difficulties of the 1930s. The 
rate of increase in production exceeded the rate of increase in labor 
supply during the 1970s and 1890s. During the 1930s, however, the 
volume of industrial productiondid not keep up with the labor supply. 
Indeed, the Federal Reserve index of production shows that during 9 of 
the 10 years production was lower than during 1929; for only 1 year, 
1937, it exceeded the previous high level, and then by only 3 
points.(24) In the meantime, labor supply increased substantially 
each year. Throughout the 1930s, the labor force continued to grow. 
The average rate of growth was 600,000 each year. It reached a total 
of 55 million in 1940.
Further evidence of the lack of expansion during the 1930s can be 
seen in the data on national income. Previously, the long-term trend 
in national income was upward, reaching its high point in 1929. Then 
it declined drastically until 1933. In 1939, when national income 
reached it highest total during the 1930s, it approximated the 1929 
total in terms of "real income."(25) It was thus a decade without 
expansion.
As the 1930s, the economy during the 1960s and 1970s also had 
difficulties. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, there was another 
belief unlike those in the 1930s. This belief was that welfare 
programs reduce the incentive to work. It is possible, but it is most 
likely to be experienced by those Americans who remain at or near the 
poverty level even when holding down full-time jobs. Nevertheless, 
neither the expansion of the poverty programs in the 1960s and 1970s, 
nor the decisive contribution they made to reducing poverty, seems to
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have come at the cost of much reduction in the incentive of Americans 
to become a part of the work force and earn a living. To see this 
better, "consider that the numbers of people seeking work and taking 
jobs increased at historically high rates during these years, by 35 
percent in 1965-80 alone. Employment climbed at a far faster pace 
during and after the great acceleration of the poverty and welfare 
programs in 1965-80 than during the preceding fifteen-year period 
(employment during 1950-65 rose by 21 percent)."(26)
Following 1965, even as the government's poverty and welfare 
programs experienced their most rapid enlargement, the rate of 
increase in unemployment in the United States rose less than it did in 
most other major Western nations. The vast expansion in the number of 
employed people after 1965 and the comparatively slow rate of growth 
in the nation's unemployment, as was seen in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, 
make it apparent that the expansion of the government's attempts to 
attack poverty was not a disincentive to the number of Americans with 
the desire and ability to work.
If so many filled jobs, who then were the families living on 
welfare? The single, largest federal welfare program giving direct 
cash assistance to low-income Americans was Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). The AFDC population is distinguished by 
three main characteristics: The male— and the female-headed families 
are entirely different, the female headed families are in the large 
majority, and most families remain on AFDC only a few years.(27)
At the end of the 1970s, for example, the male-headed families 
constituted only about 14 percent of all families on the AFDC welfare 
rolls. Of these, about half the family heads couldn't work because of
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injuries or some disabling physical handicaps and conditions. Of the 
remaining male heads, most had no skills and had not completed high 
school. "By law, these able-bodied persons were required to 
participate in either a work-training program or the Work Incentive 
Program, a job location and placement service. Failure to cooperate 
in job replacement under the Work Incentive Program could lead to the 
total loss of welfare assistance, a requirement that was likely used 
as much as a threat to gain compliance as in the final 
enforcement."(28)
Throughout 1960-1980, the large majority of AFDC families were 
headed by females. Many of them had young children and turned to AFDC 
when they were widowed or otherwise separated from their husbands. 
Critics contend that long-term welfare dependency frequently develops 
in these families. However, because having very young children to 
care for is so often an important factor in not holding a job, and 
because the total number of children in AFDC families is small, AFDC 
has a high turnover. One study reports that 75 percent of all AFDC 
cases close within three years; another puts the figure at 60 
percent.(29)
The work ethic continues to prevail in the United States. For 
the majority of AFDC recipients, the use of the federal government's 
major welfare program has been transitory, except when family heads 
are disabled. Moreover, it is important to note that even as such 
assistance became more widely available, the number of Americans who 
became employed grew at an unprecedented rate and the ratio of 
unemployment grew comparatively little. "Even among the families 
living in poverty, the percentage of family heads who were employed in
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the late 1970s was almost as high as in the early 1960s, before the 
programs' rapid expansion. Something else was going on in America; it 
was not a denial of the work ethic."(30)
Instead, the economy's growth, combined with the sizable 
expansion of income after inflation that accompanied it, simply failed 
on its own to reach large numbers of people. As indicated earlier, 
this was due partly to the intensely crowded labor markets after 1965. 
Despite these circumstances, the government programs of the 1960s and 
1970s "reduced the percentage of Americans living in poverty by more 
than half, greatly surpassing the impact of even a substantial 
expansion of the private economy, which itself reduced poverty by 
about 10 percent."(31) Moreover, the private economy concentrated its 
smaller contribution on helping those Americans who were in the 
strongest economic position. The government's programs worked toward 
reaching and reducing poverty within the economically less competitive 
groups.
Industrialization
Industrialization has been one of the factors that brought change 
to the status of Americans. Modern industry demands a large, 
flexible, mobile, and motivated labor supply. In the early stages of 
economic development, this manpower is typically recruited from people 
accustomed to rural life.(32) It is often said that industrialization 
brings increased differences in the division of labor and more 
specialized jobs.
One can see the impact of industrialization by looking at any 
time period. There has a sharp decline in farm people-such as owners,
managers, and laborers. At the same time, the white-collar,
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professional, and administrative employees have been expanding 
steadily.
The "semi-professionals" have been growing even faster than the 
"professionals"; just from 1940 to 1950 there was a 50 percent 
increase.(33) Laboratory and x-ray technicians, engineering aides, 
electronic technicians multiplied. The advance in industrial and 
medical technology is one reason. Another reason is the allocation to 
less-trained persons of tasks formerly performed by doctors, dentists, 
teachers, engineers, and scientists, who are now in short supply.
A second major trend has been the growth in managerial ranks that 
reflects a rise in large-scale organization. Increased 
specialization brings an emphasis on coordination to achieve a unified 
product.
A third major shift has been within the manual worker catagory. 
The "working class" has grown only slightly since 1910 but there has 
been a dramatic change in its occupational composition. "The 
percentage of nonfarm laborers dropped sharply from 12 percent of the 
labor force to 6 percent. The semi-skilled increased from 14 percent 
to 20 percent."(34)
A fourth major trend concerns the types of industries in which 
people work. In general, advancing industrialization first moves 
people out of the industries which extract or produce raw materials 
into industries which convert raw materials into finished products. 
Then, industrialization moves people out of these industries into 
another, which includes, business repair services, public 
administration, finance, insurance, wholesale and retail trade.
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While these four trends continue, there is another development, 
working in the same direction. "There is an upgrading of the whole 
population; there is a growth in occupationally relevant knowledge. 
Advancing industrialization brings over-all specialization and a net 
shift away from hand work and toward brain work and personal 
contact."(35)
In the United States a large segment of the labor force now faces 
a two-fold threat. First, there is a constant danger of being made 
redundant by technological advances, particularly for those in 
manufacturing. In addition, inexpensively produced foreign goods have 
been eating away the domestic market and contracting American sales 
abroad.
The two factors, according to a 1985 estimate, resulted in over 2 
million households experiencing job loss at some point in the course 
of the previous three years. Though 70 percent of the people affected 
subsequently found other jobs, about one-half of them had to swallow 
pay cuts of at least 5 percent.(36) A second consequence has been a 
steady climb in the level of "acceptable" unemployment.
This has worried many people. Americans are generally more 
productive than workers of other countries, but foreign workers are 
willing to work for less pay. Because of this, American businesses 
are taking their firms abroad where they can find cheaper labor. When 
they do this, they are taking jobs away from Americans. Another 
consequence is that businesses are cutting wages. Such wage cutting 
has been taking place mainly at the expense of younger members of the
labor force
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Both of these consequences have had an effect on unemployment and 
poverty levels. One of the leading forces in keeping wage levels up 
were unions. Today the unions have considerably less power than they 
did in the past. The unions, therefore, are blaming foreign trade for 
loss of jobs, an erosion of wage levels, and a weakening of organized 
labor* s bargaining power.
Women and Employment
As was mentioned before, the failure of the economy to expand and 
create new jobs resulted in a large-scale problem of unemployment.
This was especially true for women. The situation encountered by 
women in the private sector of the economy has always been difficult. 
Even after very high rates of growth, the private economy left 
millions of women and their families in poverty. As can be seen in 
Table 3.8, the percent of women in the labor force has increased 
steadily over the years. Also, when you refer back to Tables 3.1 and 
3.4, you will see that women have had a higher unemployment rate over 
the years. Traditionally, the job opportunities available to women 
have been more marginal than those available to men, and in the 
crowded labor markets of the post-Eisenhower years, the competition 
women faced in getting better jobs only increased in intensity as 
compared with earlier years.(37) In addition, family separations 
increased and more single women were required to assume the role of 
family head. Employment opportunities for women with very young 
children to care for were scarce. This combination of very difficult 
circumstances helps explain what the census figures on poverty show: 
Had it not been for the government’s presence, hardly any change in
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the rate of poverty facing this very large group of Americans would 
have been realized over the whole of this prosperous period.(38)
Inflation
Inflation is another factor that can change the perceived results 
of the job programs. And by just looking at the numbers that are 
presented in tables, we can come to erroneous conclusions.
Inflation is almost always caused by excess aggregate demand. 
Generally the excess demand has been generated by too rapid an 
increase in a nation’s money supply. One bad thing about inflation is 
that its impact on different groups Is decidely unequal. A person 
whose Income or assets are fixed in nominal terms loses; those who can 
adjust the prices of items they have for sale are protected.(39) The 
person who owes money is at an advantage, because the repayment of 
debts requires less sacrifice of future goods. Creditors lose because 
they are repaid with dollars that will buy fewer goods than when they 
were lent. People on pensions and holders of government bonds, life 
insurance policies, or bank deposits are creditors who obviously lose 
during an inflation. Morley says that "one can regard inflation as a 
kind of tax which reduces purchasing power, as all taxes do. It is a 
very discriminatory tax, falling unequally on different groups of 
taxpayers In the economy."(40)
Dunson and Jackson wrote an article in which they reviewed 
previous work by others on the distributional aspects of inflation, 
the effects of inflation on both the distribution of family income and 
on the poor, and Income-specific price indexes.(41) Several of the 
authors they reviewed touched on the effects of inflation on wealth. 
The methods of investigation included simple trend analysis,
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regression analysis, income-class-specific index numbers, and 
microsimulation. The general conclusion from these studies was that 
inflation can be biased against certain income and consumer groups.
For example, Andrew Brimmer, who is the only author to have considered 
differences by race, found the distribution of income for whites moved 
in the direction of more equality during 1961-1965 and 1965-1968.(42) 
This trend is not in evidence for nonwhites over the same period.
Besides an unequal impact on different groups, another cost of 
inflation is that it causes the economic system to operate 
inefficiently. Because inflation may involve income loss, it is 
reasonable to expect people to try to protect themselves against that 
possibility.(43)
Stabilization
Stabilizing an economy after a period of inflation is probably 
the most difficult economic maneuver that a government can attempt. 
Stabilization at such a time means cutting back someone's spending and 
consumption must fall. Someone, then, must lose his job.
The goal of stabilization is to return to a desired rate of 
increase in prices, with the least possible loss in production during 
the transition period.(44) The cost of stabilization through demand 
reduction is a period of dislocation, falling output, and high 
unemployment. Stabilizing by price and wage controls is costly in 
terras of government bureaucracy and creates the possibility of 
inefficient and inequitable price and wage decisions.
Schwartz states evidence that supports the role of government in 
the reduction of poverty. Whereas economic growth reduced the poverty 
of one in ten Americans, governmental intervention reduced that of
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more than one in two Americans over the same period, a rate of five to 
six times greater than that of the private economy. He also states 
that the government's programs were vital in fighting poverty 
precisely because the private sector was itself incapable of making 
more than a marginal dent in poverty among the many millions of 
Americans who remained trapped within the weaker economic groups.
These have been the major factors that can determine whether or 
not a job program, in reality, has had an effect in reducing poverty 
and unemployment levels. However, it is impossible to determine which 
of the factors has an effect at a certain time and in what intensity. 
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
We sometimes forget that full-time employment is not always 
feasible for some people, such as the elderly, the permanently ill or 
disabled, and most single heads of families with very young children. 
Many millions of poor Americans are members of these groups. The 
manpower programs were relevant to comparatively few of these people. 
To enable these Americans to rise out of poverty, the various direct 
assistance and in-kind programs of government constitute the only 
realistic help that could have been made available.
Yet there remain Americans with very low levels of education, 
many not having finished high school or perhaps even the eighth grade 
and many with virtually no job skills. Job training programs might 
help them. In 1970, one in five males in the American labor force had 
not gone beyond the eighth grade. Many of these people were 
unemployed. Others, though employed, earned only a subsistence 
living. Consequently, more than a million American families headed by 
a fully employed person continued to live in poverty.(1)
From all the evidence concerning poverty in America and the 
impact of governmental programs that have attempted to redress 
poverty, three observations stand out. First, poverty in America 
cannot always be overcome by working continuously full time. To this 
reality, more than 5 million members of American families can testify
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even today.(2) Second, economic growth in the private sector does not 
necessarily reduce poverty more than marginally. Third, the 
government's programs to attack poverty, though at times seriously 
flawed, frequently were effective. They reduced poverty by more than 
half.(3)
The post-Eisenhower years were more difficult than we sometimes 
realize. With the spill of workers into the American labor force from 
1965 through today, the nation faced a combination of potentially 
explosive circumstances. Because the number of job seekers climbed 
rapidly, even the economic growth of the post-Eisenhower years and the 
increased pace with which new jobs came into being were inadequate in 
providing sufficient employment. Whereas many people in the stronger 
economic groups could take advantage of the great prosperity of these 
years, some more than doubling their real incomes, those people in the 
weaker, less competitive economic groups were overwhelmed by the 
intense competition for jobs. Many of these people— the elderly, 
women, people with low levels of education, and the younger adults of 
the weakest groups— were left virtually untouched by the substantial 
economic growth of the day.(4) The economic disparity between the 
weaker and the stronger economic groups could only grow larger, 
possibly far larger, without the presence of some compensating 
mechanism. A most basic goal of the attack on poverty was to assure 
that all Americans benefited from the nations's economic expansion.
This burst of people entering the job market shocked the nation's 
economy. The job market could not possibly absorb all the job 
seekers, especially the young who constituted much of the crowded
generation
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Yet the present administration is pushing legislation that will 
force welfare recipients to take paying jobs. The White House didn't 
propose a national policy but instead invited states to formulate 
their own proposals, calling for demonstration projects around the 
country.(5) The National Governor's Association is behind several 
proposals of the cities. Their calls for reform come down to one 
thing. And that is forcing those on public assistance into the labor 
market. None of the proposals deals adequately about the real reasons 
that most adult welfare recipients don't take paying work: they are 
already working— raising children.(6) The reforms now under 
consideration offer minimal training, poor job placements with 
inadequate health coverage, and too-small subsidies for childcare.
According to the new breed of reformers, which includes both 
conservatives and liberals, welfare must be overhauled because it 
breeds illegitimate children and dependency and erodes the work ethic. 
Conservatives call AFDC an "enabler— a program which enables women to 
live without a husband or a job."(7) In other words, conservatives' 
recent rush to reform welfare reflects their agenda for the labor 
market and the family. If a woman can live without a job, that's a 
problem for employers, particularly employers who depend on women's 
cheap labor. If a woman can live without a husband, that means major 
changes in the balance of power between men and women. For 
conservatives, welfare reform means workfare: forcing welfare 
recipients to work off their benefits or lose them.
Liberals have concluded that welfare must "create a system where 
it is always better to work than be on public assistance."(8) For
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liberals, welfare reform means workfare also. But they add training 
and childcare subsidies to the work reqirement.
A recent welfare reform bill approved by the House Public 
Assistance Subcommittee gives some indication what welfare recipients 
can expect. The bill, authored by Rep. Harold Ford (D-TN), would 
compel mothers whose children are over three years old to participate 
in job training and placement programs. States would be required to 
provide $175-$200 per child per month for childcare expenses and set 
up training and education programs designed to result in job 
placements. The federal government would pay 60% of the cost of the 
programs.(9)
Over the past 15 years, the number of low-paid jobs in the United 
States has been rising. This has been especially true in the Reagan 
years. Despite chronically high unemployment rates, there is a 
shortage of workers willing to take the low-wage service jobs that are 
replacing the high-wage union jobs lost in recent years. The labor 
shortage in particularly acute in urban areas where many welfare 
recipients reside. The current proposals for welfare reform are 
designed to increase the supply of workers to low-wage employers.
The immigration reform bill recently passsed by Congress also has 
employers worried. The law is expected to reduce the supply of 
undocumented workers who do much of the low-wage work in the United 
States. Many employers fear a shortage of people willing to work for 
the low wages they pay.
The state welfare programs being used as models for federal 
legislation fail to adequately address welfare realities. Training is 
usually short-term, and often sex-typed. Nurse's aide training is
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common; computer programming instruction is not. Childcare benefits 
are insufficient to pay for adequate care for children.
In addition, many low paying jobs do not offer health insurance 
as a benefit. In Massachusetts, whose program has been considered one 
of the most successful, a recent survey of recipients placed in jobs 
showed that only 55% had any health coverage where they worked; only 
14% received benefits paid in full by the employer.(10) The federal 
legislation currently under consideration does no better than the 
state programs in providing these necessities for welfare recipients 
entering the paid work force.
This year's competition to claim credit for welfare reform is an 
early skirmish in the upcoming presidential election. For 
Republicans, an attack on welfare is an attack on the role of 
government in redistributing income to the poor. For Democrats, 
welfare reform is an opportunity to demonstrate that they are 
efficient state managers. They emphasize the cost-saving aspects of 
proposals to show that they can do more than just throw money at 
problems. This new image, they hope, will sweep them into office in 
19 88.
But whoever is elected in 1988 is likely to find that while he 
may be able to kick families off welfare, in so doing he won't reduce 
poverty. The current range of reform proposals doesn't address the 
basic problems that generate poverty: unemployment, low-paying jobs 
without benefits, inequitable wages for women, and an inadequate 
supply of affordable childcare. Also work programs don't deal with 
the problems of old age and ill health.
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If the policy goal is to expand the labor market options 
available to welfare recipients, the most important consideration 
should not be welfare reform but rather raising the effective wages of 
the work that is available to them. Such a change, which workers have 
as much interest in demanding as those on public assistance, would 
involve mandating both higher cash wages— by at least raising the 
minimum wage— and employer-provided benefits like health insurance and 
childcare.(11) Then those welfare recipients who want to enter the 
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Table 1.1. Characteristics of the Poor, 1983
Persons in families Unrelated Individuals
Poor as % Poor as %
Number of total Number of total
Characteristics (thousands) in category (thousands) in category
TOTAL 
Age Group
28,434 14.1 6,832 23.4
Under 18 13,705 22.1 102 94.1
18 to 64 13,302 10.8 4,457 21.7
65 and over 
Race of family 
householder
1,427 8.1 2,273 2 6.5
White 5,223 9.7 5,291 20.9
Black 2,1 62 32.4 1,334 40. 8
Other races 256 1 8.4 20 7 33.4
Spanish origin 
Family status
933 2 6.1 370 34.0
Householder 7,641 12.3 (X) (X)




6,837 8. 8 (X) (X)
no husband present 3,557 36.0 4,213 2 6.2
All other
Education of family 
householder, 
age 25 or over
4,084 7.8 2,619 10.9
8 years or less 1,908 22. 6 NA NA
1-3 years high sch. 1,53 8 20.5 NA NA
4 years high school 2,229 10.5 NA NA
College, 1 year + 1,003 4.7 NA NA
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, printed by Sar A. Levitan,
Programs in Aid of the Poor, 5th edition, Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 8.
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Table 3.1. Unemployment Rates for Selected Groups in the Labor Force:
1956 to 1970
All Civilian Workers White Blacks and Other Races
Year Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
1970 4.9 4.4 5.9 4.5 4.0 5.4 8.2 7.3 9.3
19 69 3.5 2.8 4.7 3.1 2.5 4.2 6.4 5.3 7.8
19 68 3. 6 2.9 4.8 3.2 2. 6 4.3 6.7 5. 6 8.3
19 67 3.8 3.1 5.2 3.4 2.7 4. 6 7.4 6.0 9.1
1966 3.8 3.2 4.8 3.3 2.8 4.3 7.3 6.3 8. 6
19 65 4.5 4.0 5.5 4.1 3. 6 5.0 8.1 7.4 9.2
19 64 5.2 4. 6 6.2 4.6 4.1 5.5 9. 6 8.9 10. 6
19 63 5.7 5.2 6.5 5.0 4.7 5.8 10. 8 10.5 11.2
19 62 5.5 5.2 6.2 4.9 4. 6 5.5 10.9 10.9 11.0
19 61 6.7 6.4 7.2 6.0 5.7 6.5 12.4 12.8 11.8
1960 5.5 5.4 5.9 4.9 4. 8 5.3 10.2 10.7 9.4
1959 5.5 5.3 5.9 4.8 4. 6 5.3 10.7 11.5 9.4
1958 6.8 6. 8 6. 8 6.1 6.1 6.2 12. 6 13. 8 10. 8
1957 4.3 4.1 4.7 3. 8 3. 6 4.3 7.9 8.3 7.3
1956 4.1 LO • 00 4. 8 3,6 3.4 4.2 8.3 7.9 8.9
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1972, pp. 128-129, and 144, as printed in 
Historical Statistics, p. 135.
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Table 3.2. Percent Distribution of Families by Money Income Levels in





















1970 11.4 12.5 14.4 23.3 12.5 8.2 18.0
19 69 10. 8 12.0 14.4 23.9 12.4 9. 5 17.0
19 68 11.1 12.7 15.4 23.9 12.2 10.7 14.0
19 67 12.5 12. 8 16.1 24.3 11.8 10.5 12.0
1966 13.4 13.2 16.8 24.4 11.9 9.9 10.2
19 65 14. 8 14. 6 17.2 24.4 10.9 8.8 9.2
19 64 15.8 15. 8 17. 8 23. 6 10. 6 8.3 8.0
19 63 16.7 16.0 19.0 23. 8 9. 6 7. 7 7.3
19 62 17. 6 1 6.7 19.9 23.2 8. 8 7.0 6.9
19 61 18.8 17.2 19. 8 22.9 8.1 6.4 6. 6
1960 18.9 17.2 21.1 22.9 7.9 6.2 5.7
1959 19.1 18.0 21.8 22.7 7. 6 5. 6 5.1
1958 20.4 19.5 23.3 21.8 6.2 4.9 4.0
1957 20.4 19.0 24.1 22.0 6.4 4.4 3. 6
1956 20.0 19.2 23.3 22.3 6.4 4.4 4.2
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data, as printed in 
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Washington, D.C., p. 
290.
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 
series P-60, No. 154, and unpublished data, as printed in 
Historical Statistics, p. 436.
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Table 3.3. Percent Distribution of Families, by Race of Head, by Money

























1970 9. 7 11.7 14.1 23. 8 13.1 8.5 19.1
19 69 9.4 11.0 14.0 24.4 13.0 9.9 1 8. 1
1968 9. 6 11.7 15.3 24.7 12. 8 11.2 14.9
19 67 10.7 11.9 16.0 25.1 12.4 11.2 12. 8
1966 11.7 12.2 1 6.7 25.2 12.5 10.5 11.1
19 65 12. 8 13.5 17.3 25.5 11.5 9.3 9.9
19 64 13.7 14.7 18.0 24.7 11.2 8.9 8. 6
19 63 14.3 15.1 19.3 24. 8 10.3 8.3 8.0
19 62 15.3 15. 8 20.3 24.5 9.4 7.4 7.5
1961 1 6.2 1 6.5 20.4 24.3 8. 6 6. 8 7.3
1960 16.4 16.5 21.7 24.1 8.5 6.5 6.2
1959 1 6.4 17.4 22.4 24.0 8.1 6.0 5.5
1958 17. 6 19.1 24.2 23.1 6. 6 5.3 4.3
1957 17. 6 18. 6 24.9 23.3 6.7 4.8 3.9
1956 17.3 18.7 24.1 23.7 6.9 4.9 4. 6
BLACKS AND OTHER RACES
1970 25.0 19.5 1 6. 8 17.9 7. 6 4.5 8.5
19 69 23. 6 20.4 17. 8 19.0 7.0 4.9 7.2
1968 24.5 22.1 16. 6 17.7 7.6 5.5 6.0
19 67 27.2 21.5 17.7 1 6.9 6.5 5.2 5.0
1966 29.0 23.1 17.5 1 6. 8 6.3 4.4 2. 7
19 65 33.0 25.0 1 6. 6 14. 6 4.9 3.8 2.0
19 64 34.4 25.1 16.5 13.7 4.9 3.2 2.4
19 63 39.2 24.1 1 6.1 13. 6 2.9 2.1 2.0
19 62 40.0 2 6.7 15.7 10. 6 3.2 2.4 1.4
19 61 42. 8 23.3 15.0 11.0 3.3 2.5 1.8
1960 42.0 23.1 15.9 11.9 3.1 2. 6 1.4
1959 45.4 23.7 15.8 10.2 2.7 1.3 .7
1958 48.3 24.1 15.1 8.4 2.0 1.3 . 8
1957 4 6.7 24.0 1 6.4 9.3 2.4 .9 .4
1956 4 6.5 25.7 15. 6 8.9 2.0 . 8 .5
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data, as printed in
Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 291.
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, as 
printed in Historical Statistics, p. 436.
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Table 3.4. Unemployment Rates for Selected Groups in the Labor Force:
1966 to 1985
All Civilian Workers White Blacks and Other Races
Year Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
1985 7.2 7.0 7.4 6.2 NA NA 15.1 NA NA
19 84 7.5 7.4 7. 6 6.5 NA NA 15.9 NA NA
1983 9. 6 9.9 9.2 8.4 NA NA 19.5 NA NA
1982 9.7 9.9 9.4 8. 6 NA NA 18.9 NA NA
1981 7. 6 7.4 7.9 6.7 NA NA 15. 6 NA NA
1980 7.1 6.9 7.4 6.3 NA NA 14.3 NA NA
1979 5.8 5.1 6. 8 5.1 NA NA 12.3 NA NA
1978 6.1 5.3 7.2 5.2 NA NA 12.8 NA NA
1975 8.5 7.9 9.3 7.8 NA NA 14. 8 NA NA
1970 4.9 4.4 5.9 4.5 4.0 5.4 8.2 7.3 9.3
19 69 3.5 2.8 4.7 3.1 2.5 4.2 6.4 5.3 7. 8
1968 3. 6 2.9 4.8 3.2 2. 6 4.3 6.7 5. 6 8.3
19 67 3.8 3.1 5.2 3.4 2.7 4. 6 7.4 6.0 9.1
1966 3. 8 3.2 4. 8 3.3 2. 8 4.3 7.3 6.3 8. 6
NA - Not Available
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1972, pp. 128-129, and 144, as printed in 
Historical Statistics, p. 135.
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, 
monthly, as printed in Statistical Abstract, p. 375.
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Table 3.5. Percent Distribution of Families by Money Income Levels in



















1985 4. 8 8.5 10.2 7 6.5
1984 4. 8 8.9 10.5 75.8
1983 5.2 9.2 10. 8 74. 8
1982 5. 1 9.3 11.1 73.5
1981 4.3 9.1 11.3 74.3
19 80 3.9 8.9 10.4 7 6.8
1975 3.3 8.9 10.4 77.4
1970 11.4 12.5 14.4 23.3 12.5 8.2 18.0
19 69 10. 8 12.0 14.4 23.9 12.4 9.5 17.0
1968 11.1 12.7 15.4 23.9 12.2 10.7 14.0
19 67 12.5 12. 8 1 6.1 24.3 11.8 10.5 12.0
1966 13.4 13.2 16. 8 24.4 11.9 9.9 10.2
* Prior to 1970, Money Income Levels in Constant (1967) Dollars; and 
after 1970, Money Income Levels in Constant (1985) Dollars.
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data, as printed in 
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Washington, D.C., p. 
290.
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 
series P-60, No. 154, and unpublished data, as printed in 
Historical Statistics, p. 436.
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1987 (107th edition), Washington, D.C., p.
43 6.
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Table 3.6. Percent Distribution of Families, by Race of Head, by Money






















1985 3. 7 7..5 9. 7 79.1
1984 3. 7 7.,7 9.9 7 8.7
19 83 3. 9 7., 7 10.4 78.0
1982 3.9 7.,9 10.5 77.7
1981 3. 3 7., 8 10. 8 78.1
1980 3.0 7., 6 9.9 79.5
1975 2. 7 7., 7 9.9 79.7
1970 9.7 11.7 14.1 23.8 13.1 8.5 19. 1
19 69 9.4 11.0 14.0 24.4 13.0 9.9 18.1
19 68 9. 6 11.7 15.3 24.7 12.8 11.2 14.9
19 67 10.7 11.9 1 6.0 25.1 12.4 11.2 12.8
1966 11.7 12.2 1 6.7 25.2 12.5 10.5 11.1
BLACKS AND OTHER RACES
19 85 13. 5 17., 1 14.3 54.1
1984 14. 3 18., 8 14. 8 52.1
1983 14. 3 20., 1 14.1 51.5
1982 14. 4 19.,9 15.7 50.0
19 81 12. 8 20., 1 14.1 51.4
1980 11. 4 19.,3 15.3 54.0
1975 8.5 20.,3 14.7 56.5
1970 25.0 19.5 16.8 17.9 7. 6 4.5 8.5
19 69 23. 6 20.4 17. 8 19.0 7.0 4.9 7.2
19 68 24.5 22.1 1 6. 6 17.7 7.6 5.5 6.0
19 67 27.2 21.5 17.7 1 6.9 6.5 5.2 5.0
1966 29.0 23.1 17.5 1 6. 8 6.3 4.4 2.7
* Prior to 1970, Money Income Levels in Constant (1967) Dollars; and 
after 1970, Money Income Levels in Constant (1985) Dollars.
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, unpublished data, as printed in
Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 291.
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, as 
printed in Historical Statistics, p. 436.
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U. 
S., Washington, D.C., p. 436.
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Table 3.7. Demographic Characteristics of the Poverty Population over 
the Last Generation (numbers in millions)
1959 1966 1970 1975 1980 1983
Number poor 39.5 2 8.5 25.4 25.9 29.3 35.3
Percent poor 22.4 14.7 12. 6 12.3 13.0 15.2
Aged
Number poor 5.5 5.1 4.7 3.3 3.9 3.7
Percent poor 35.2 2 8.5 24.5 15.3 15.7 14.1
Children
Number poor 17.2 12.1 10.2 10.9 11.1 13.3
Percent poor 2 6.9 17.4 14.9 1 6. 8 17.9 21.7
Nonaged adults
Number poor 16.8 11.3 10.5 11.7 14.3 18.2
Percent poor 17.4 10. 6 9.2 9.4 10.3 12. 6
Individuals in female- 
headed families
Number poor 10.4 10.3 11.2 12.3 14. 6 1 6. 8
Percent poor 50.2 41.0 3 8.2 34. 6 33.8 35.7
Blacks
Number poor 9.9 8.9 7.5 7.5 8. 6 9.9
Percent poor 55.1 41.8 3 8.2 34. 6 33.8 35.7
Whites
Number poor 28.5 19.3 17.5 17. 8 19.7 24.0
Percent poor 18.1 11.3 9.9 9.7 10.2 12.1
SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, as printed in Sar A. Levitan. 
Programs in Aid of the Poor, 5th ed., Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 10.
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Table 3.8. Labor Force Participation Rate (percent) by Sex: 1947-1970
Year* Total Male Female
1970 61.3 80. 6 43.4
1969 61.1 80.9 42.7
1968 60.7 81.2 41. 6
19 67 60. 6 81.5 41.1
1966 60.1 81.4 40.3
1965 59.7 81.5 39.3
19 64 59. 6 81.9 3 8.7
1963 59. 6 82.2 3 8.3
1962 59.7 82. 8 38.0
19 61 60.2 83. 6 3 8.1
1960 60.2 84.0 37. 8
1959 60.2 84.5 37.2
1958 60.4 86.2 37.1
1957 60. 6 85.5 3 6.9
1956 61.0 86.3 3 6.9
1955 60.4 86.2 35.7
1954 60.0 86.4 34. 6
1953 60.2 86.9 34.5
1952 60.4 87.2 34. 8
1951 60.4 86.3 3 6.9
1950 59.9 86. 8 37.5
1949 59. 6 86.9 33.2
1948 59.4 87.0 32.7
1947 86. 8 31.8 31.8
1946 55. 8 81.1 30. 8
1945 61.6 87. 6 35.8
1944 62.2 88.2 3 6.2
1943 61.5 87.4 35.7
1942 58.0 85.1 30.9
1941 5 6.1 83.8 2 8.5
* After 1947, 16 years and older; prior to 1947, 14 years and older.
SOURCE: Annual Data, 1940-1946, U.S. Bureau of Census, Current
Population Reports, series P-50 and P-25 ; 1947-1970 U.S.
Department of Labor , Manpower Report of the President, March
1972, pp. 158-159; John D. Durand, The Labor Force in the
United States, 1890-1960, Social Science Research Council,
New York, 1948, as printed in Historical Statistics, pp.
131-132.
